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INTRODUCTION 
Sentencing guidelines are far better than the indeterminate sentencing 
that preceded them.  Guidelines, enforced by appellate review, discipline 
sentencing courts and ensure that they consider the legislature’s or sentenc-
ing commission’s policy choices.  The threat of reversal is a key component 
of guidelines.  Not only do reversals alter sentences, but more importantly 
the threat of reversal constrains sentencing courts ex ante.  This discipline 
and consistency make criminal sentencing more transparent and legitimate.  
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, we acknowledge, may be too harsh.  
However, undermining the Guidelines system because sentences seem too 
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long is counterproductive.  Binding guidelines still leave room for substan-
tial judicial discretion.  Without them, Congress may rely more on manda-
tory minimum sentences, which can be harsher and even more rigid.  
Though sentencing guidelines have many advantages, they are in jeop-
ardy.  Beginning with Apprendi1 in 2000, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Sixth Amendment as limiting judicial guideline sentencing.  Although 
juries must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, until recently guideline 
sentencing compelled judges to adjust sentences based on facts that they 
found by only a preponderance of the evidence.  Apprendi required that ju-
ries, not judges, find the facts needed to increase a defendant’s sentence be-
yond the statutory maximum.  Blakely extended Apprendi, striking down a 
mandatory state sentencing guideline because it raised sentences based on 
judicial findings of fact.2  In the Court’s view, judges may not raise sentenc-
ing ranges based on their own factual findings, because doing so effectively 
punishes defendants for crimes more serious than those found by juries.  A 
year later, Booker solved the same problem with the binding Federal Guide-
lines by making them “effectively advisory.”3  In other words, the Federal 
Guidelines no longer compel judges to give higher sentences based on facts 
not found by juries, but simply advise them to do so. 
But Booker left unclear exactly how loose appellate review must be to 
satisfy the Sixth Amendment.  For example, if appellate courts review with-
in-Guidelines sentences more deferentially than outside-Guidelines sen-
tences, then the Federal Guidelines retain at least some binding force.  Risk-
averse sentencing judges might use within-Guidelines sentences as rela-
tively safe harbors.  Too much deference to the Guidelines would in effect 
make them mandatory again. 
In the post-Booker cases of Rita,4 Gall,5 and Kimbrough,6 however, the 
Court continues to equivocate about appellate review.  On the one hand, it 
mandates deferential review for all sentences.  Yet, on the other hand, it ac-
cords the Guidelines some weight as starting points from which to measure 
deviation.7  Larger deviations from guidelines may receive greater scrutiny, 
 
1  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires 
prosecutors to prove any fact that increases a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum, ex-
cept recidivism, to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).   
2  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–05 (2004) (extending Apprendi to require proof to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt of all facts that raise a defendant’s maximum sentence under sentencing 
guidelines). 
3  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–65 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial majority opinion) (re-
medying the Blakely problem with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines not by requiring juries to find sen-
tencing facts but by making the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory and replacing de novo 
appellate review with review for “unreasonableness”). 
4  Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
5  Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). 
6  Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). 
7  See infra Part I.B (discussing these three cases). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102512
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but how far can one take this principle without violating the Sixth Amend-
ment? 
In this Essay, we evaluate the Court’s evolving guideline jurisprudence 
and suggest the best direction for it.  We focus on evidence from the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, but most of our lessons and recommendations 
should translate to state guideline systems as well.8  Our approach is prag-
matic.  In Part I, drawing on positive political theory and empirical evi-
dence of judicial sentencing practices, we contend that sentencing judges 
should defer significantly to sentencing guidelines.  A key benefit of guide-
lines is that they create sentencing structures that make meaningful appel-
late review possible.  Highly structured, detailed guidelines make decisions 
more transparent by requiring sentencing judges to provide clear, explicit 
reasons for increasing or decreasing sentences from prescribed baselines.  
Guidelines, coupled with a politically diverse judiciary, limit unwarranted 
policy discretion and make criminal sentencing more uniform and politi-
cally legitimate. 
In Part II, we consider what sentencing could look like under a system 
of advisory guidelines.  The Court has thus far provided little guidance, 
apart from requiring appellate courts to review the reasonableness of 
within-Guidelines sentences.  The problem is that for guidelines to have any 
meaning, within-guideline sentences must receive greater deference than 
those that depart from guidelines.  We suggest a solution to this doctrinal 
puzzle.  Courts could improve guidelines by closely reviewing fact-bound 
adjustments, which are the most manipulable part of the Federal Guidelines.  
When sentencing judges use factual findings to adjust sentences signifi-
cantly, appellate scrutiny should increase.  Stricter review of sentencing 
judges ensures that they defer to guidelines and avoid injecting political 
ideology or other bias into their factfinding.  Less defensible, however, is 
the Court’s approval of expanding Guidelines departures based on policy 
grounds.  Giving sentencing courts policy discretion bespeaks too rosy a 
picture of the judiciary’s competence and makes sentences harder to review 
by removing objective benchmarks for departures. 
Finally, Part III considers more radical reforms.  Positive political the-
ory of courts suggests some potentially new structures for appellate review 
of sentences.  As we discuss below, politically mixed appellate panels or 
sentencing review courts could have a moderating influence by keeping 
ideology in check.  Likewise, restricting waivers of appeals could streng-
then appellate review as a check on sentencing-judge variation. 
 
8  We capitalize Guidelines when referring specifically to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but use 
lower case when referring more generally to the idea or practice of guideline sentencing in state as well 
as federal courts.  We use the terms trial court, sentencing court, and district court interchangeably to 
refer to courts that find facts and impose sentence in the first instance, and trial judge, sentencing judge, 
and district judge to refer to the judges of those courts.  Likewise, we use the terms appellate court and 
circuit court interchangeably to refer to courts that review sentences on appeal, and appellate judge or 
circuit judge to refer to members of those courts. 
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I. THE STRUCTURE AND POLITICS OF SENTENCING 
A. Sentencing Guidelines as Political Compromise 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines embody political compromises on 
the appropriate sentencing ranges for various crimes and the factors that 
should aggravate and mitigate sentences.  The Sentencing Reform Act of 
19849 acknowledged that politics and ideology influence criminal sentenc-
ing by requiring political balance on the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion: the Act set up a seven-member commission and mandated that no 
more than four members could come from the same political party.10  
Knowing that criminal sentencing is highly ideological, Congress set up a 
mechanism to produce political compromise.  The deal that Congress struck 
included sentencing guidelines that judges would have to apply.  The com-
promise produced a system biased towards higher sentences, as the public 
and Congress prefer to err on the side of harshness.  Implicit in the ar-
rangement was the assumption that the courts would faithfully enforce the 
Guidelines. 
The Guidelines improve criminal sentencing in a variety of ways.  
First, they set up a zone of decision legitimacy—sentencing ranges—for 
sentencing courts’ outcomes in individual cases.  The recommended sen-
tencing ranges and specified, weighted aggravating and mitigating facts are 
more legitimate than random or ad hoc case-specific factors.   
Second, the Guidelines make appellate review of sentencing manage-
able.  Structured, detailed guidelines are more transparent; sentencing 
judges must explain clearly why they are raising or lowering sentences.  
Sentencing facts fall into identifiable, recurring categories that higher courts 
can use to test sentences against the Guidelines’ goals.  The detailed struc-
ture of the Guidelines better enables courts to enforce the deals made by 
Congress and the Sentencing Commission over sentencing policy.   
B. The Structure of the Federal Guidelines 
The Sentencing Table, reproduced in the Appendix, is the key to un-
derstanding Federal Guidelines sentencing.11  This table is no longer manda-
tory, but even after Booker, a sentencing judge determines the 
recommended ranges in the table in the same way as before.12  The sentenc-
 
9  Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 
U.S.C.). 
10  28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006). 
11  Post-Booker, this basic structure has survived but is no longer mandatory.  We discuss the post-
Booker world in greater detail below, but because our data are pre-Booker, we also discuss the pre-
Booker framework.   
12  For example, Justice Breyer was careful to note that judges must consider the Sentencing Guide-
lines range and continue to make fact findings in light of the Guidelines, conduct sentencing hearings, 
and justify departures.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259–60, 263 (2005). 
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 1375
ing judge uses the Sentencing Commission’s detailed regulations to calcu-
late the defendant’s numeric offense level.  The crime of conviction deter-
mines the base offense level.  The judge then applies adjustments, adding or 
subtracting levels based on various factors, such as the use of a gun, the of-
fender’s role in the crime, and his acceptance of responsibility.  The of-
fender’s previous crimes determine his criminal history category.  These 
two factors—offense level and criminal history—yield a sentencing range 
expressed in months.  These determinations are then subject to appellate re-
view.13  The top of the sentencing range is roughly twenty-five percent 
above the bottom of the range.14  Under the mandatory system used before 
Booker, appellate courts lacked jurisdiction to review the sentence if a sen-
tencing judge had properly calculated the range and sentenced within that 
range.15   
Before Booker, the Sentencing Reform Act authorized judges to depart 
from the calculated sentencing range if there was an “aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into con-
sideration by the sentencing commission in formulating the Guidelines that 
should result in a sentence different from that described.”16  Under the Act, 
a judge must justify a departure by making a statement in open court or in a 
written opinion.17  Prosecutors could appeal downward departures and de-
fendants could appeal upward departures.18  Factors “not ordinarily rele-
vant” could still be considered in departure decisions if they were present to 
such a degree that the case fell outside “the heartland of the Guidelines.”19  
In effect, a sentencing court was at greater risk of reversal if it used the 
more extreme departure mechanism to lengthen or shorten the sentence.   
These details reflect the political compromise that Congress struck.  
Congress allocated sentencing discretion among itself, the Sentencing 
Commission, and the courts.20  The courts retained discretion at three differ-
 
13  18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2006). 
14  While the Sentencing Commission set the offense levels and criminal history categories, the Sen-
tencing Reform Act mandated that the top of each sentencing range be no more than six months or twen-
ty-five percent above the bottom of the Guidelines range, whichever is greater.  28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) 
(2006) (providing also that the maximum may be life where the minimum is at least thirty years). 
15  18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). 
16  Id. § 3553(b)(1); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K.2.0 (2008) (grounds for 
departure policy statement). 
17  18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1994) (before amendment by PROTECT Act). 
18  Id. 
19  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 16, § 5K2.0 (grounds for departure policy 
statement) (as amended Nov. 1, 1994).  The Supreme Court later endorsed the heartland concept.  See 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 109 (1996). 
20  Using sentencing guidelines as an example, Steven Shavell offers a formal treatment of optimal 
discretion within a framework of binding constraints.  Steven Shavell, Optimal Discretion in the Appli-
cation of Rules, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 175 (2007).  Shavell views the zone of discretion as a tradeoff 
between the desire to constrain agents (courts) to behave in conformity with the wishes of the principal 
(Congress) and the benefits of individualized treatment, which require the delegation of discretion.  Id. 
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ent levels.  First, sentencing judges retained absolute discretion within the 
sentencing range.  Second, sentencing judges could use adjustments, preap-
proved by the Commission or Congress, to change sentencing ranges.  
These adjustments were based largely on findings of fact and so received 
deferential appellate review.  Finally, departures let judges apply their tradi-
tional sentencing discretion by departing from the Guidelines framework.  
They could depart, however, only if they found, and the appellate court 
agreed, that the unique facts fell outside the heartland of typical cases envi-
sioned by Congress and the Commission in the Guidelines. 
Booker upended this compromise by declaring the Guidelines advisory 
while still preserving their constitutionality.  Post-Booker, sentencing courts 
are no longer limited to modifying sentences through specified adjustments 
within the Guidelines or departures regulated by the Guidelines.  They may 
instead simply offer some other reason outside the Guidelines’ structure to 
vary from the Guidelines.  In addition, sentences within properly calculated 
Guidelines ranges are now subject to appellate review.  But Booker raised 
more questions than it answered.  How should appellate courts review 
within-Guidelines sentences?  How should they review departures and ad-
justments?  Booker answered that the new standard was reasonableness in 
light of the Guidelines but offered little illustration.21  The Court added only 
a little clarity thereafter in Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough. 
Rita v. United States held that courts of appeals may presume that 
within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable because they reflect the judg-
ment and expertise of both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Com-
mission.22  But did this mean that appellate courts should review out-of-
range sentences less deferentially?  Gall v. United States answered that 
question, holding that courts of appeals must review sentences both within 
and without the Guidelines under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.  
Courts should use the Guidelines as their starting point and benchmark, and 
they may take the degree of variance from the Guidelines into account.  Ap-
pellate courts may not, however, require extraordinary circumstances or ap-
ply rigid mathematical ratios when reviewing deviations from the 
Guidelines.  Doing so would erect an impermissible presumption of unrea-
sonableness and thus make the Guidelines too binding.23  In sum, the Court 
equivocated, on the one hand mandating deferential review for all sen-
                                                                                                                           
at 176–78.  Thus, the cost to Congress of permitting individualized treatment is that the courts may ex-
press policy preferences within the zone that properly belongs to Congress. 
21  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261–63 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial majority opinion). 
22  127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462, 2464–65 (2007). 
23  Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594–97 (2007).  In addition, Kimbrough v. United States 
held that a district court could disagree with the policy choices embedded in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines’ crack-cocaine guidelines because the Commission itself had not relied on empirical data or 
experience in promulgating it, had criticized this guideline as overly harsh, and had tried to change it.  
128 S. Ct. 558, 567–69, 574–75 (2007). 
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tences, yet on the other hand according the Guidelines some weight as start-
ing points from which to measure deviation.   
C. Judicial Politics and Obeying the Guidelines Bargain 
In disrupting the Guidelines system, the Court seemed unconcerned 
with the problem of interjudge disparity.  Congress authorized, and the 
Commission promulgated, these sentencing rules to reduce the influence of 
judges’ idiosyncrasies on sentences.  As Congress recognized, judges matter 
a great deal in determining final sentences.  Judges’ sentencing philosophies 
vary, and these philosophies often reflect their political ideologies and 
demographic characteristics.  These philosophies and characteristics corre-
late with widely divergent sentences.24   
Though unwarranted disparities remain,25 studies suggest that the Fed-
 
24  A considerable amount of research suggests that judges have different sentencing philosophies 
and that those philosophical differences influence outcomes.  See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. 
ELDRIDGE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE 
JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 36 (1974) (finding differences among judges in the hypothetical sen-
tences they would impose on identical offenders); John S. Carroll et al., Sentencing Goals, Causal Attri-
butions, Ideology, and Personality, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 107 (1987) (demonstrating 
how a judge’s ideology is reflected in how she thinks about the causes of crime and the goals of sentenc-
ing); Shari S. Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Re-
duction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 114 (1975) (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that the judges’ differing 
sentencing philosophies are a primary cause of the disparity.”); Brian Forst & Charles Wellford, Pun-
ishment and Sentencing: Developing Sentencing Guidelines Empirically from Principles of Punishment, 
33 RUTGERS L. REV. 799, 813 (1981) (finding that judges oriented toward utilitarian goals of incapacita-
tion and deterrence gave sentences that were at least ten months longer than judges motivated by other 
goals).  See generally Paul Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge 
Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 250 (1999) (“‘[L]iberals’ tend to believe that 
factors external to the offender are responsible for criminal behavior.  Rehabilitation is more of a sen-
tencing goal for these judges, leading to greater reliance on probation and less concern with retribution.  
‘Conservatives’ believe that offenders choose to commit crimes.  They are more punishment-oriented 
and tend to impose longer prison terms.”). 
25  See generally DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? 177 (1993); Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: Effects of Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence 
Outcomes for Drug Offenses, 1991–1992, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 789 (1997); David B. Mustard, Racial, 
Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 
285 (2001) (finding that, no matter how one cuts the data—within-Guidelines sentences, departures, 
drug crimes, etc.—substantial unexplained racial and gender disparities exist); Max M. Schanzenbach & 
Michael L. Yaeger, Prison Time, Fines and Federal White-Collar Criminals: The Anatomy of Racial 
Disparity, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2006); Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Dispari-
ties in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 
(2005) (using district-level variation in judicial characteristics and finding some evidence that minority 
and female judges sentence differently).  Studies on the effect of judicial characteristics on sentencing at 
the state level have demonstrated that judicial demographic characteristics matter for sentencing.  See, 
e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge’s Gender 
Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163 (1999) (finding, in a study of 
Pennsylvania criminal cases, that female judges tended to sentence offenders more severely, were more 
likely to incarcerate minorities, and were less likely to incarcerate women). 
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eral Sentencing Guidelines have at least slightly reduced interjudge dispari-
ties.26  Recent work on state guidelines systems also suggests that manda-
tory guidelines have significantly reduced sentencing variation.27  In two 
recent articles, Schanzenbach and Tiller considered how judges’ political 
characteristics interact with the Federal Guidelines’ structure.  One article 
analyzed a very large dataset, using changes in the ratio of Democratic ap-
pointees versus Republican appointees in each district to identify ideologi-
cal effects on sentencing.28  Another analyzed a smaller dataset that actually 
identified the judge’s political affiliation by looking at the party of each 
judge’s appointing President.29  Both studies came to remarkably similar 
conclusions.  For serious crimes—robbery, firearms, drug trafficking, extor-
tion, and murder—Democratic appointees’ sentences were, on average, 
seven to eight months lower than Republican appointees’ sentences.  This 
discrepancy amounted to roughly ten percent of the average sentence.30  
Those studies also considered the effect of appellate review on district 
court sentencing and drew two conclusions.  First, Democratic appointees 
to district courts were more likely to adjust sentences downward than were 
Republican appointees, regardless of the politics of the reviewing court.  
Conversely, Republican-dominated districts were more likely to adjust sen-
tences upward than were districts dominated by Democratic appointees, 
again regardless of the circuit court’s politics.  In other words, the prefer-
ences of the circuit did not influence offense-level adjustments (within-
Guidelines sentencing).  Democratic- and Republican-appointed district 
court judges used offense levels to adjust prison sentences to roughly the 
same degree whether they were in majority-Democratic or majority-
Republican appointed circuits.  Judges most likely follow this pattern be-
 
26  See John M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 303–04 (1999) (finding a decrease in interjudge 
disparities in sentence length after the Guidelines, but cautioning that the advent of mandatory minimum 
sentences might have contributed to the decline); Hofer et al., supra note 24, at 289 (concluding that the 
Guidelines slightly decreased interjudge sentence disparities.). 
27  John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effective-
ness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235 (2006).  Pfaff’s findings indicate that voluntary 
guidelines, such as those adopted in some states, can reduce sentencing variations.  The results suggest, 
however, that reduction in variance for violent and property crimes is much greater for mandatory guide-
lines than for voluntary ones, though drug crimes may not follow this pattern.  See id. at 263–67 & 
tbls.3–4.  Though suggestive, Pfaff’s study cannot support strong inferences, as only two states adopted 
voluntary guidelines during the time frame of his sample.  Id. at 256–57.   
28  Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the Sentencing Guidelines: 
Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (2007). 
29  Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Poli-
tics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715 (2008). 
30  The studies did not find any differences for white-collar offenses such as fraud, tax, embezzle-
ment, and antitrust crimes.  But because of low offense levels and low sentences, there were technical 
problems that prevented us from reaching a conclusion about less serious crimes. 
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cause fact-oriented adjustments received more deferential appellate re-
view.31 
On the other hand, Democratic district court appointees in majority-
Democratic circuits departed to a degree greater, in terms of length of sen-
tence, than Democratic appointees in majority-Republican circuits.  In addi-
tion, we found some evidence that departures were more likely in these 
cases as well.  This result was in line with our theoretical prediction: be-
cause appellate courts review law-oriented departures more stringently than 
fact-oriented adjustments, the reviewing court’s political alignment was 
more important for departures.  The converse position did not hold: Repub-
lican-appointed district court judges did not depart upwards more frequently 
in Republican-dominated circuits.32  This result makes sense because the 
Guidelines encourage upward adjustments and have high presumptive sen-
tences to begin with, so usually there is little need to depart upwards.  In 
addition, this reasoning explains why Republican-appointed district court 
judges did not have to give lower sentences in Democratic-dominated cir-
cuits: they could rely on the high presumptive sentences, upward adjust-
ments, and the safe harbors provided by the Guidelines.  Note that upward 
departures were rare before Booker,33 suggesting that judges who wanted to 
raise sentences found it easy to do so within the Guidelines.  The asymmet-
rical ease of increasing sentences within the Guidelines has some important 
implications, which we will explore later.  
The studies above illustrate how vertical political alignment between 
courts—alignment between lower and higher courts—can increase or de-
crease transparency and sentencing consistent with the Guidelines.  Non-
sentencing research also suggests that horizontal political alignment on 
three-judge appellate panels can influence obedience to legal doctrine.  
Specifically, Cross and Tiller found that circuit court panels were more 
likely to ignore the Chevron doctrine in administrative law cases when (1) 
the three judges were all appointed by Presidents of the same political party, 
and (2) the doctrine ran counter to their political preferences.  When the 
panels were diverse, judges obeyed legal doctrine more, whether or not they 
favored the resulting outcomes.34 
Thus, where there is a clear rule, a political minority can invoke it to 
produce the outcome intended by the rulemaker.  But where there is no clear 
rule or only a vague standard, the majority can more easily dominate the 
outcome with its own preferred policy choice.  The political minority can 
 
31  Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 28; Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 29.  
32  Schanzenbach, & Tiller, supra note 28, at 47–52. 
33  In fiscal years 1998 through 2002, before the PROTECT Act took effect, the rate of upward de-
partures varied between 0.6% and 0.8%.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.G (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/fig-g.pdf. 
34  Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Court of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998). 
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do little more than engage in hard-knuckled political compromises, log-
rolling decisions, or potentially disruptive dissents. 
The same logic would likely apply to the sentencing policy compro-
mises hammered out in the Sentencing Guidelines.  The appellate panel is 
more likely to check sentencing court abuses if (1) the sentencing rules are 
clear, and (2) the appellate court has at least one member whose politics dif-
fer from those of the sentencing court—in other words, if the panel itself is 
politically diverse.  If the sentencing or appellate judge were to slant the 
Guidelines toward his political preferences, at least one appellate judge with 
different political preferences could act as a whistleblower.  Political diver-
sity thus checks Democratic appointees who would stretch the Guidelines to 
impose lower sentences and Republican appointees who would stretch the 
Guidelines to impose higher sentences.35   
For guidelines to deter evasion and manipulation, however, they must 
bind both sentencing and appellate courts.  The more discretion appellate 
courts give sentencing courts to apply sentencing guidelines, the less guide-
lines will ensure consistency and legitimacy.  Put differently, ideological 
forces and judicial discretion will push sentences to high and low extremes, 
especially when there is no political diversity to keep judges honest.  
We now turn to the Supreme Court’s post-Apprendi sentencing juris-
prudence.  The next Part analyzes the Court’s treatment of adjustments and 
departures after Booker.  The Court’s reasonableness review standard for 
within-Guidelines sentences may improve the Guidelines, but the Court’s 
increasing acceptance of departures is likely to undermine the legitimacy of 
the Guidelines.  Most distressing is the new policy-grounds departure, 
which circuit courts will find hard to review.   
II. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EVOLVING 
REASONABLENESS STANDARD 
To enforce the Guidelines’ political compromise and reduce sentencing 
disparities, courts need structures that foster robust appellate review.  The 
main issue raised by Booker and its progeny is precisely how stringently 
appellate courts should review departures and within-Guidelines sentences.  
The Court’s answer so far is hard to decipher.  Booker, Rita, and especially 
Gall signal that sentencing courts should have greater discretion in sentenc-
ing, which means that they should be freer to depart from the Guidelines.  
However, these cases require courts of appeals to review sentences for rea-
sonableness even if sentencing courts have calculated sentences properly 
within the Federal Guidelines.  Thus, the Court has both expanded sentenc-
ing courts’ discretion to depart from the Guidelines and regulated their for-
merly absolute discretion to sentence anywhere within the Guidelines.  
 
35  For a formal theoretical treatment of appeals in a discretionary system, see Shavell, supra note 
20, at 187–89. 
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Indeed, Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Rita carefully noted that the review 
of within-Guidelines sentences, while deferential, should be meaningful and 
substantive, not purely procedural.36  How can one possibly make sense of 
this doctrinal tangle?  Why would the Court emphasize judicial discretion in 
one sphere while seemingly constricting it in another?   
One might perhaps view the Court’s apparent inconsistencies as an ef-
fort to address the asymmetries of the pre-Booker sentencing regime.  Be-
fore Booker, most offense-level adjustments pushed sentences upwards, and 
base offense levels often started out high.  As a result, the Sentencing 
Guidelines made it pretty easy for sentencing courts to increase sentences 
via offense-level adjustments and harder for appellate courts to review these 
adjustments.  In addition, the sentencing court’s refusal to grant a down-
ward departure was basically unreviewable.   
Apprendi and Booker reflected the Court’s unease with this pro-
prosecution asymmetry.  The constitutional problem, after all, is with sen-
tencing courts’ raising sentences based on facts not proven to juries.  Be-
cause appellate review is so important, as discussed earlier, expanding 
appellate review to include within-Guidelines sentences makes some sense.  
We are much more skeptical, however, of reducing the scrutiny of depar-
tures, in particular the creation of fuzzy, hard-to-review policy departures.37 
A. Reasonableness Review of Within-Guidelines Sentences 
The Federal Guidelines pre-Booker made it very easy to raise sen-
tences via adjustments or departures but left less room to reduce them.  Al-
most all departures explicitly permitted in the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual are upward departures, such as departures based on 
dangerousness, a crime resulting in death, or inadequacy of criminal his-
tory.38  Downward departures are generally discouraged, as are departures 
based on factors already accounted for by the offense level, such as accep-
tance of responsibility.39  In addition, the vast majority of adjustments al-
lowed by the Guidelines are upward adjustments.40  These factors combine 
with the Federal Guidelines sentencing table, which increases sentences ex-
ponentially by offense level, as the following graph shows: 
 
36  Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2473–74 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
37  Granted, appeal waivers in plea bargains threaten to undercut appellate review’s efficacy as a 
guarantor of consistency.  We grapple with this problem and possible solutions to it later in this Essay.  
See infra Part III.B. 
38  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 16, §§ 4A1.3, 5K2.1, 5K2.6.  Courts may 
also depart downward for overstatement of criminal history, but unlike upward departures, these down-
ward departures face a lower bound.  See id. § 4A1.3(b)(2)–(3).   
39  Id. §§ 5K2.0(2), 5K2.20. 
40  See, e.g., id. ch. 3 (listing ten upward adjustments, including the rules for increasing sentences for 
multiple counts, but only two downward adjustments, for minor or minimal role in the offense (§ 3B1.2) 
and acceptance of responsibility (§ 3E1.1)). 
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One of the strongest substantive objections to the Federal Guidelines is 
to their asymmetry.  This asymmetry may have been at play in Apprendi and 
Blakely.  Indeed, those cases limited both upward departures and adjust-
ments but did not affect sentence reductions.  In practice, however, these 
cases likely did not constrain prosecutors much, as creative prosecutors can 
construct multicount indictments to raise defendants’ statutory and guide-
lines maxima.  In addition, the higher penalties associated with higher of-
fense levels increased judicial discretion to raise sentences.  Judges inclined 
to raise offenders’ sentences may do so through upward adjustments, which, 
as detailed above, are harder to review on appeal.  This factor may partly 
explain why upward departures are more rare than downward departures.  
Instead of departing upward, a judge may instead choose to adjust upward. 
A judge’s ability to raise sentences by using adjustments, which are not 
subject to substantial appellate scrutiny, will increase sentencing disparities.  
Indeed, our studies found that Republican and Democratic appointees dif-
fered consistently on adjustments and that appellate courts did not affect 
these differences much.41  Of course, in theory the pre-Booker Guidelines 
compelled judges to adjust upward when the necessary facts were proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  In practice, however, many cases left 
the sentencing judge leeway to make factual findings that faced only limited 
appellate scrutiny, especially in close cases.  
Appellate courts, we suggest, should interpret Booker and Rita’s rea-
sonableness review of within-Guidelines sentences as a directive to review 
adjustments a little more rigorously.  This is a little different from determin-
ing whether the within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable.  The advantage of 
reviewing adjustments more rigorously is that specific guideline factors 
guide appellate review.  In addition, instead of the pre-Booker approach of 
adjustment-by-adjustment review, the reasonableness standard may permit 
 
41  Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 28, at 45–48. 
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appellate courts to review sentences based on the cumulative effect of ad-
justments.  For example, imagine that in a fairly standard drug trafficking 
case a court piles on adjustments for a large drug quantity, major role in the 
offense, and other potentially relevant factors.  Because the adjustments 
lead to a much higher sentence, both the factual and legal findings under-
pinning the adjustments deserve a close look on appeal.   
In addition to reviewing adjustments cumulatively, appellate courts 
should pay special attention to adjustments that raise or lower sentences 
substantially.  Among these are adjustments for career offenders and ad-
justments for substantial monetary losses or drug amounts.42  In addition, 
departures that are encouraged by the Guidelines, which have previously 
received more deferential review,43 should also get a closer look.  Key ex-
amples are departures based on the inadequacy of the criminal history or 
because the crime caused a death not otherwise reflected in the sentence.44  
These high-stakes departures generally increase sentences and can do so 
dramatically.  Because the stakes are so high in these cases, appellate courts 
ought to take a closer look instead of deferring. 
A closer appellate look in these instances should counteract the politi-
cal extremes discussed earlier.  Three-judge panels will be less likely to re-
flect extreme views than a single judge.  A randomly chosen three-judge 
panel may well have a mix of judges with different perspectives.  This di-
versity will moderate both the panel’s deliberation and the district court’s 
idiosyncrasies, especially if the two courts differ in their politics or ideol-
ogy.  While appellate courts inevitably defer somewhat to the sentencing 
judge who heard the evidence, they may still check decisions and improve 
consistency.  Because adjustments and encouraged departures more often 
increase sentences, reasonableness review of within-Guidelines sentences 
will encourage judges to tie enhancements more closely to the facts and the 
crime of conviction.  Thus, stricter review of adjustments may best address 
Blakely’s and Booker’s constitutional concerns.   
 
42  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 16, § 4B1.1 (providing for a career 
offender adjustment that creates a new offense level based on the statutory maximum); id. § 2T4.1 (de-
fining tax loss adjustments that vary offense levels from six to thirty-six); id. § 2B1.1 (defining loss ad-
justments for frauds and thefts that vary offense levels from six to thirty-six); id. § 2D1.1 (varying drug 
offense levels from six to thirty-eight depending on quantity of drugs). 
43  In United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), the Court clearly specified a lower standard of re-
view for encouraged factors, holding that if “the special factor is an encouraged factor, the court is au-
thorized to depart if the applicable Guideline does not already take it into account.”  Id. at 96.  However, 
if the factor is a discouraged factor, “the court should depart only if the factor is present to an excep-
tional degree.”  Id.  
44  For example, in United States v. Mayle, 334 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2003), defendant Mayle was con-
victed of various counts of wire fraud and forgery relating to his cashing of social security checks.  The 
original sentencing range was fifteen to twenty-one months, but the sentencing judge attributed three 
murders for which he was not convicted (two in furtherance of his fraud).  The judge departed upward 
339 months based both on inadequacy of the criminal history and death caused by the crime.  Id. at 555–
57. 
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How exactly would a system of robust adjustment review work?  In 
McMillan, an early state sentencing case, the Supreme Court suggested in 
dicta that a higher standard of review would apply to factual findings when 
they become the “tail wagging the dog of the substantive offense.”45  Before 
Booker and Blakely, the Third Circuit had adopted a “clear and convincing” 
standard of review for fact findings that dramatically increased the overall 
sentence.46  A few other circuits toyed with the same idea,47 but most circuits 
clearly rejected this view.48  Blakely considered the McMillan approach 
when dealing with state guideline sentencing enhancements, but rejected it 
in favor of a bright-line approach rejecting any mandatory enhancements to 
sentences based on facts not determined by a jury.49  The Third Circuit has 
recently overruled its clear-and-convincing standard based on the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Blakely.50   
We think, however, that the Third Circuit erred in interpreting Blakely, 
especially in light of Booker and Rita.  Blakely was concerned with a man-
datory system of sentencing, and there the Court rejected shifting standards 
of review as a basis for preserving a mandatory system.  The Court was not 
addressing appellate review in the current system of Guidelines, which are 
no longer mandatory but must carry some weight.   
Perhaps appellate courts are uncomfortable scrutinizing fact-intensive 
adjustments closely.  The Third Circuit’s pre-Booker clear-and-convincing 
approach may not have caught on for this very reason.  Searching appellate 
review of adjustments may seem difficult, if not impossible, because sen-
tencing judges are uniquely positioned to find facts and weigh their rele-
vance and credibility.  But appellate courts have not been so reluctant to 
review fact-bound determinations in other areas of law.  For example, in 
administrative law, courts engage in sweeping review of the facts deter-
 
45  McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986). 
46  In United States v. Kikamura, 918 F.2d 1084 (1990), the Third Circuit held that an extreme in-
crease in sentence, from thirty months to thirty years, required proof by “clear and convincing” evi-
dence.   
47  See, e.g., United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 833 (9th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that proof by 
clear and convincing evidence may be necessary “when a sentencing factor has an extremely dispropor-
tionate effect on the sentence relative to the offense of conviction”); United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 
365, 369–70 (8th Cir. 1991) (discussing but not applying the clear-and-convincing standard because the 
evidence at hand failed an even lower standard). 
48  See United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 n.19 (6th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that judges have 
discretion within Apprendi limits, so no greater fact-based review is required); United States v. Cordoba-
Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard at 
sentencing for uncharged murders); United States v. Valdez, 225 F.3d 1137, 1143 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting clear-and-convincing evidence standard at sentencing even though relevant conduct dramati-
cally increased sentence). 
49  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 307–08 (2004). 
50  United States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558, 570 (3d Cir. 2006).   
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mined by expert agencies,51 but defer more to agency findings of law under 
Chevron.52  The administrative law emphasis is quite the opposite of current 
sentencing review.  Of course, the constitutional implications of criminal 
sentencing and administrative agency review are quite different.  But insti-
tutional competency—the ability of a higher court to delve into the lower 
court’s or agency’s factfinding—does not dictate automatic deference to 
findings of fact in criminal sentencing. 
To date, appellate courts have not taken advantage of Justice Stevens’s 
invitation to review within-Guidelines sentences substantively.  Indeed, it 
was more than two and a half years after Booker before an appellate court 
reversed a within-Guidelines sentence as substantively unreasonable.53  Per-
haps reversals are so rare because the Court has provided too little guidance 
for substantive reasonableness review.  However, greater appellate review 
of adjustments provides clear guidance and will help to make sentencing 
more consistent by policing overly long sentences.   
In short, we suggest more aggressive appellate review of fact-based ad-
justments, particularly those that raise or lower sentences substantially.  Our 
proposed approach has the benefit of preserving much of the political com-
promise that the Guidelines represent, while at the same time expanding the 
protection that appellate review provides.  We do not know how many sen-
tences our proposed review standard would affect.  However, given the tens 
of thousands of federal criminal sentences since Booker, surely more than 
one merited reversal as an unreasonable within-Guidelines sentence.   
B. Appellate Review of Departures 
The basic structure of the Federal Guidelines requires appellate courts 
to scrutinize departures more closely than within-Guidelines sentences.  If 
one wishes to transfer discretion to sentencing courts, one must give them 
greater leeway to depart.  As suggested by the Gall Court, one way to do 
this is to review departures more deferentially.  Another way is to increase 
 
51  The Administrative Procedures Act requires application of the “substantial evidence test” in re-
view of formal adjudications and formal rulemakings, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2006), and de novo 
review in very limited circumstances, id. § 706(2)(E)–(F).  Informal adjudications and informal rule-
makings are subject to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review, which courts have generally in-
terpreted as hard-look review.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 51–52 (1983); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
52  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
53  United States v. Paul, 239 F. App’x 353, 354–55 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished per curiam); Dou-
glas A. Berman, Ninth Circuit Reverses Within-Guideline Sentence as Substantively Unreasonable!!, 
Sentencing Law and Policy, Aug. 17, 2007, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
2007/08/ninth-circuit-r.html (“A full 31 months and five days since Booker, today has brought what I 
believe constitutes the very first appellate reversal of a within-guideline sentence as substantively unrea-
sonable.”). 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1386 
the costs of manipulating adjustments within the Guidelines, by for example 
increasing the risk of appellate reversal.  This insight helps to explain the 
presumption-of-reasonableness battle in Rita.  Justice Breyer and the pro-
Guidelines faction may have been happy to save the Guidelines by making 
departures a bit easier.  Nonetheless, stricter appellate review of departures 
than of within-Guidelines sentences preserves much of the structure of the 
Guidelines. 
The Court’s combined approach, reducing scrutiny of departures while 
increasing scrutiny of within-Guidelines sentences, blurs the distinction be-
tween trial courts’ sentencing instruments.  On the one hand, sentencing 
courts can no longer rely as easily on Guidelines factors in sentencing—
though in practice they continue to do so.  On the other hand, sentencing 
courts are less likely to be reversed for departures under Gall’s deferential 
abuse-of-discretion standard.54  Although courts of appeals may presume 
within-Guidelines sentences to be reasonable, they may not presume out-
side-Guidelines sentences unreasonable.55  Thus, sentencing courts will rely 
more on departures and less on adjustments than they used to.  That does 
not mean that they will use departures a great deal more or that adjustments 
are now as risky as departures.  It simply means that Booker, Rita, and Gall 
changed the relative cost of using one or the other.  In addition, the political 
context may amplify these effects.  Political diversity in the courts will lose 
its moderating influence on sentences, as appellate courts cannot enforce 
the zone of decision legitimacy established by the Guidelines’ sentencing 
ranges.  The power of political diversity in a judiciary depends on clear le-
gal boundaries such as guidelines.  At best, political diversity without 
guidelines means hard-knuckled, case-by-case, ideological compromises.  
Guidelines give dissenters a tool to compel compliance with the law, curb-
ing politicized deviations from the law. 
This state of affairs is troubling.  When appellate courts relax review of 
departures, they allow more variance in otherwise normal guidelines cases.  
To be sure, post-Booker empirical evidence suggests that federal sentencing 
practices have not changed much.  Average sentence length and probability 
of imprisonment actually increased slightly.  However, judge-induced 
downward departures and variances have increased by nearly fifty percent, 
from 8.6% to 12.5% of all sentences.56  Upward departures doubled, from 
0.8% to 1.6%.57 
 
54  Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007) (“[T]he abuse-of-discretion standard of review 
applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions—whether inside or outside the Guidelines 
range.”). 
55  Id. at 595 (quoting Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2467 (2007)). 
56  The effect of Booker depends very much on what the relevant comparison period is.  The 
PROTECT Act was effective in the year and a half before Booker, and it restricted the use of downward 
departures and encouraged prosecutors to appeal them more often.  The Sentencing Commission’s statis-
tics indicate that in the eight months before the PROTECT Act, the average judge-induced departure rate 
was 8.6%; the rate fell to 5.5% while the PROTECT Act was in effect, but increased to 12.5% (compris-
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These facts are consistent with two different explanations.  First, al-
though average sentences changed little, interjudge variance may have in-
creased.  Those judges who are increasing sentences may offset those who 
are decreasing sentences.  In other words, average sentences have not 
changed because both upward and downward departures increased.  Simi-
larly, circuits that adopt strong presumptions of reasonableness may effec-
tively treat the Guidelines as safe harbors.  In aggregate statistics, these 
cautious circuits may mask important changes in other circuits.  
The second possible explanation is that district judges’ sentencing pat-
terns have not changed much post-Booker.  However, because the Court has 
blurred the distinction between sentencing instruments, district court judges 
merely choose to use departures more often.  In other words, it may now be 
easier and less risky for district court judges to get where they want to go 
using departures instead of adjustments.  Of course, we would have to do a 
much more detailed analysis before we could conclude that nothing signifi-
cant has changed.  More importantly, the decisions in Rita and Gall are too 
recent to be reflected in the data.  Those who deplored the Guidelines for 
their harshness, however, can take no comfort from the data so far.  Sen-
tences have not decreased, and upward departures have increased.  
There is some room for greater use of departures within the framework 
we have laid out.  One reason to depart is because the punishment mandated 
by the Guidelines does not seem to fit the crime.  This may occur when a 
series of adjustments results cumulatively in an unusually harsh sentence.  
Indeed, we suspect that such circumstances lie behind many departures, 
both pre- and post-Booker.  Before Booker, sentencing courts had to shoe-
horn such cases into a permitted or discouraged ground.  Prior doctrine did 
not permit departures solely because the sentence seemed unreasonable.  
For example, courts may have invented the aberrant-act departure to reduce 
sentences for defendants who seemed neither especially blameworthy nor 
dangerous but faced long Guidelines sentences.  Booker and its progeny 
may have had such cases in mind.  Thus, a reasonable new ground for de-
parture may be one in which the facts compel a large number of upward ad-
justments, rendering the Guidelines range inappropriate.  This ground is 
much more limited than the reasonableness standard the Court lays out, 
however, because it still anchors sentences to the Guidelines.  In addition, it 
would not permit the judge to inject his policy preferences into the sentence 
overtly, an issue to which we now turn. 
                                                                                                                           
ing 3.2% downward departures plus 9.3% Booker variances) in the year following Booker.  U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL 
SENTENCING app. E, at E-1 (2006).    
57  Id. 
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C. Policy Preferences as Grounds for Departures and Variances 
While fact-based adjustments and departures deserve some leeway, as 
discussed above, policy-based ones do not.  An individual judge’s policy 
preferences should not influence sentencing.  Those idiosyncratic policy 
preferences are not relevant to society’s decision to punish, incapacitate, or 
deter criminals.  In addition, courts lack the institutional competence to 
make systemic policy choices.  Congress has established an agency, the 
Sentencing Commission, to collect data and the views of various constitu-
encies in formulating policies and rules.  Congress, not courts, can hear ex-
pert testimony about the dangers and harms of various crimes and the best 
ways to address them.  Congress, not courts, sets budgets and has to balance 
priorities such as funding for prisons and law enforcement.  Most impor-
tantly, Congress has democratic legitimacy; courts do not. 
The Guidelines did not completely constrain judges’ ability to act on 
their own policy preferences in sentencing.  Judges’ policy preferences may 
still influence adjustments and discretion within sentencing ranges, but they 
are constrained by the facts, the Guidelines framework, and appellate re-
view.  In addition, the Guidelines range, formerly a safe harbor, specified 
the zone of influence a judge was to have in a standard case.  Thus, even 
under the Guidelines, the ultimate sentence may still reflect a judge’s policy 
preferences.  The rationale for these moving parts, however, was that no set 
of rules could foresee and address the myriad individual characteristics that 
may arise.  Congress did not authorize judges to follow their policy prefer-
ences, but was willing to pay some of that price so that judges could give 
some individualized justice. 
Unfortunately, Rita and especially Kimbrough give sentencing courts 
substantial latitude to incorporate their own policy preferences at sentenc-
ing.  Kimbrough embraced the government’s concession that “courts may 
vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, in-
cluding disagreements with the Guidelines.”58  Kimbrough was an excep-
tional case, where the Sentencing Commission itself had tried to back away 
from the 100:1 sentencing ratio for crack versus powder cocaine.  Neverthe-
less, Rita embraced this principle more generally.  It asserted that a sentenc-
ing court may entertain “argu[ments] that the Guidelines reflect an unsound 
judgment, or, for example, that they do not generally treat certain defendant 
characteristics in the proper way.”59   
The Guidelines tried to harmonize divergent views on whether, for ex-
ample, youth or family circumstances should aggravate or mitigate sen-
tences or be irrelevant.  Some judges thought young offenders more 
sympathetic; others thought them more dangerous and likely to recidivate.  
 
58  Kimbrough v. United States. 128 S. Ct. 558, 570 (2007) (quoting Brief for United States at 16, 
Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-6330)). 
59  Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). 
103:1371  (2009) Policing Politics at Sentencing 
 1389
The Commission split the difference, deciding that age should be irrelevant 
to sentencing except in extraordinary cases.60 
Rita destroys this uniformity, removing these policy choices from a 
central, transparent body that may possess some expertise and democratic 
legitimacy.  The result will likely be a greater dispersion of sentences due 
solely to judges’ varying policy preferences.  Sentencing-court discretion 
makes sense when judges need to tailor rules to case-specific facts, but it 
makes much less sense for recurring policy issues susceptible to rules, or at 
least rules of thumb.  Indeed, Rita is far too sanguine about sentencing-
court discretion for discretion’s sake, and not careful to guard against the 
idiosyncratic policy preferences of a single unelected judge.   
Moreover, in returning these policy choices to hundreds of judges, the 
Court discouraged them from being completely candid and transparent.  
Sentencing courts must articulate reasons for deviating from the Guidelines, 
but at the same time are discouraged from adopting clear rules.  Indeed, the 
Court in Kimbrough praised the sentencing court for rejecting the Commis-
sion’s 100:1 ratio but not announcing an alternative ratio.61  The Court like-
wise discouraged appellate courts from being transparent about how they 
review the size of a departure.  Gall rejected mathematical proportionality 
as a guidepost but recognized in much fuzzier terms that large departures 
need weightier justifications.62  The upshot reminds us of the Supreme 
Court’s hand-waving in the Grutter and Gratz affirmative action cases: a 
school may give race significant or decisive weight as an admissions factor, 
but only if it does not transparently quantify that weight.63  This lack of 
transparency hinders appellate review, public scrutiny, and criticism. 
Sentencing policy discretion might make more sense in the hands of 
sentencing juries, which may represent local popular opinions.  The Ap-
prendi line of cases started as a ringing vindication of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a criminal jury trial against sentencing-court encroachment.  We are 
not fans of Apprendi or jury sentencing, but at least we understand this ar-
gument.  By the time the Court reached Booker, however, its shifting coali-
tions turned that jury right into a vindication of sentencing-court discretion.  
 
60  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 16, § 5H1.1 (policy statement regarding 
age). 
61  Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575. 
62  Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594–97 (2007) (“We also reject the use of a rigid mathe-
matical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of 
the justifications required for a specific sentence,” but “[w]e find it uncontroversial that a major depar-
ture should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.”). 
63  Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334–37 (2003) (upholding the University of Michi-
gan’s affirmative action program because it treated race as a plus within a flexible, holistic evaluation 
rather than giving it a clear weight or quota), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72 (2003) 
(striking down the University of Michigan’s racial preference in undergraduate admissions because it 
automatically gave every underrepresented minority applicant twenty out of one hundred points needed 
for admission, rather than allowing for individualized consideration). 
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In doing so, it gave the power back to the very officials who supposedly 
threatened juries.  Instead of upholding or striking down the Guidelines, the 
Court excised provisions about which sentencing judges had long com-
plained, most notably the Guidelines’ binding force.64  As a policy matter, 
this result is preferable to Justice Scalia’s reading of the Sixth Amendment.  
He would invalidate all substantive appellate review and limit appeals to 
procedural review.65  The Court, however, has rewritten the Sentencing Re-
form Act as it pleased without responding effectively to Justice Scalia’s 
challenge.  Why does the Sixth Amendment permit deferential abuse-of-
discretion appellate review, but not the de novo appellate review that Con-
gress specified in the PROTECT Act?66  Why is the Sixth Amendment case-
law now about sentencing versus appellate court discretion, instead of 
judges versus juries?  The Court has never provided a satisfactory answer to 
either question.  
Policy departures will inevitably undermine appellate review, Congress 
and the Commission’s policymaking authority, and thus consistency.  How 
is an appellate court to review a sentencing judge’s disagreement with pol-
icy?  When are policy disagreements reasonable or unreasonable?   
Of course, judges have always had some wiggle room to express their 
policy preferences.  Even under the extraordinarily detailed Federal Guide-
lines, the final range itself allowed a twenty-five percent variance in sen-
tence.  As long as the sentencing court had calculated the final offense level 
properly, the sentencing court’s discretion within that range was unreview-
able.  Sentencing judges had further discretion to impose adjustments when 
the facts were close or at least could survive clear-error review.  In addition, 
sentencing judges had discretion to depart, even though appellate courts re-
viewed departures more carefully.  We hope courts will not take the dicta in 
Rita too seriously and will limit Kimbrough to its facts, namely the extreme 
100:1 crack-cocaine sentence disparity. 
 
 * * * 
 
We have criticized the Court’s guidelines jurisprudence, which seems 
to be an unintended outgrowth of a series of fragile and shifting coalitions.  
It upends valuable federal and state sentencing reforms, yet has only tenu-
ous roots in the Sixth Amendment.67  The Court’s relaxed standard of re-
view for departures is troubling, as it will likely increase disparity.  We are 
particularly concerned that sentencing courts now have new leeway to inject 
their policy preferences into their sentences.  In contrast, our suggested ap-
 
64  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial majority opinion). 
65  Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2482–84 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).   
66  See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259, 261 (Breyer, J., remedial majority opinion). 
67  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Rita v. United States Leaves Open More than It Answers, 20 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 28 (2007). 
103:1371  (2009) Policing Politics at Sentencing 
 1391
proach would preserve much of the Court’s jurisprudence and better address 
the substantive concerns about the Federal Guidelines.  Thus, it would con-
strain overpunishment and produce more consistency.   
III. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
In our account thus far, appellate review has been the linchpin of the 
sentencing regime, holding sentencing judges in line and ensuring consis-
tency.  As we have argued, appellate review must retain enough bite to pre-
vent sentencing judges’ biases from skewing sentences.  We propose 
additional reforms that could add more teeth to appellate review as a check 
on sentencing judges’ discretion.  Section A below considers how ensuring 
political balance on courts of appeals would moderate ideological extremes 
and ensure fidelity to clear sentencing rules.  Section B then briefly notes 
the problem of waivers of appeals and why the law might restrict them.   
A. Political Alignments in Judicial Hierarchy 
Doctrine and judicial review matter in sentencing.  Previous studies 
show that appellate courts constrain sentencing courts’ law-based departures 
but leave them freer to use fact-based adjustments.68  Political alignment be-
tween the lower court and the appellate court relaxes the constraints sen-
tencing courts face when they want to depart.  Democratic appointees 
depart more in Democratic circuits, while Republican appointees behave 
about the same regardless of alignment.69  These findings fit the Guidelines’ 
structure.  Federal sentences are generally high, and adjustments, which are 
hard to review, exponentially increase them.70  While Republicans can raise 
sentences within this system, Democrats can lower them only by departing 
and only with the acquiescence of sympathetic, usually Democrat-
controlled, courts of appeals. 
A corollary is that the lack of political diversity within the judicial hi-
erarchy produces more sentencing disparity because sentencing judges do 
not fear being reversed on appeal.  Current random assignment of federal 
circuit judges to panels sometimes produces ideologically unbalanced pan-
els, with three appointees of the same party controlling the outcome.  We re-
fer to that unity as horizontal political alignment.  When such unified panels 
review a sentencing judge who holds the same political orientation as the 
panel (vertical political alignment), there is little check on the sentence’s 
severity or lenience.  Thus, a district judge sitting in a circuit that is strongly 
tilted toward ideological alignment feels less vertical constraint in choosing 
a severe or lenient sentence.  For example, the Fifth Circuit currently com-
 
68  Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 28; Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 29. 
69  Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 28, at 47–52. 
70  Of course, because upward departures are far rarer, there may be political differences in those too 
that we cannot detect because our sample size is too small. 
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prises twelve Republican appointees and only four Democratic appointees, 
so a Republican-appointed district judge is unlikely to fear reversal. 
The political structure of the judicial hierarchy and horizontal relation-
ships within a court profoundly influence how consistently courts apply 
doctrines to similar cases.  Cross and Tiller have shown that a politically di-
verse panel of judges is more likely to apply established doctrine faithfully 
than a panel of judges from the same party.  The presence of political mi-
nority members on three-judge federal appellate panels led to more consis-
tent application of the Chevron doctrine in administrative law cases.71  
Likewise, Cass Sunstein found that judges on like-minded panels appear to 
vote far less moderately than judges on divided panels.72  Richard Revesz 
reached similar findings in his study of environmental law cases.73  One 
possible explanation for this moderation is that judges within panels learn 
from one another’s ideas and worldviews, blow the whistle on extreme or 
disingenuous positions, and otherwise check abuses of discretion.  Thus, di-
vided panels are likely to decrease sentencing disparity by deterring ex-
treme positions. 
To reduce sentencing disparity, we should acknowledge the politics and 
ideology at work and consider structural changes to judicial review.  In par-
ticular, we suggest institutionalizing political diversity in sentencing cases 
by ensuring that appellate courts not share the sentencing court’s political 
orientation.  At a minimum, one could require that each appellate panel in-
clude a panel member who does not share the sentencing court’s political 
orientation.  The simplest way to do this would be to use the ideology of the 
appointing President for each judge.  There would be occasional errors; a 
few Democratic appointees are very conservative and a few Republican ap-
pointees are very liberal.  These outliers would not matter much, however, 
because most judges are true to political type (at least for sentencing issues) 
and there are many opportunities for sentencing review. 
There are various ways to achieve political diversity in sentencing.  
First, one could limit three-judge appellate panels to having at most two 
judges who share the same political orientation.  This ideological cap would 
modify the normal random assignment of appellate panels, thus always en-
suring both vertical and horizontal political diversity.74  A second mecha-
nism would be to set up a separate court of appeals for criminal cases or 
criminal sentencing and to ensure that the court is politically diverse.  The 
court could comprise current federal circuit judges, brought together in an 
alternative forum.  There is precedent for specialized courts of appeals: the 
 
71  Cross & Tiller, supra note 34, at 2172 & tbl.3. 
72  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 169 (2003). 
73  See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1717, 1752–56 (1997). 
74  Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (1999). 
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
over patent appeals from federal district courts.75 
Other government agencies use political ideology or partisan identifi-
ers to ensure balance.  Many independent regulatory commissions limit par-
tisan excess through split party arrangements.  Examples include the 
Surface Transportation Board (formerly the ICC), the National Transporta-
tion and Safety Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.76  Congress designed these agencies as in-
stitutions filled with experts who have some quasi-judicial functions, but 
with partisan safeguards to protect against ideological excess by one party.  
Most telling is the design of the United States Sentencing Commission it-
self, which by law must have seven voting members, no more than four of 
whom may be members of the same political party.77 
Some have criticized proposals to restructure courts to minimize politi-
cal bias.  Former D.C. Circuit judge Patricia Wald claims that using political 
orientation to check panel make-up would make judges act more partisan, 
as role-players.78  While that is possible, the political diversity of the mixed 
panel should nonetheless offset the extremes of either group.  In other 
words, a highly partisan yet mixed panel is more likely to sentence consis-
tently than a less charged group of like-minded partisans randomly assigned 
to the same panel. 
Professor Eric Posner has also criticized split-panel solutions.  He ar-
gues that while political diversity is good, spreading minority judges out 
means that they will never wind up being in the majority.  Random assign-
ment, in contrast, would guarantee that the minority would sometimes be in 
the majority.79  This argument misses the point about the power of a single 
minority member to blow the whistle, however.  The problem is not the vot-
ing power of an ideological majority, but ideological unanimity on a panel 
or between the sentencing and appellate court.  Unanimity makes it easier 
for ideologues to disobey doctrine and manipulate sentencing guidelines.80  
A single panel member can dissent, questioning the honesty of the major-
ity’s reasoning and publicly flagging and criticizing the manipulation.  Di-
luting minority votes by spreading them across many panels is more 
tolerable than lacking any whistleblower at all on politically unified panels.  
An alternative would be to increase the probability of drawing a minority 
 
75  28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (2006). 
76  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION: 
THE REGULATORY APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 2 (Comm. Print 1977). 
77  28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).  
78  Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235 (1999). 
79  Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter? Implications of Judicial Bias Studies 
for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853 (2008). 
80  Cross & Tiller, supra note 34, at 2172.  
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judge in certain cases that are likely to be politically charged, such as sen-
tencing cases. 
We admit that this discussion is somewhat of a thought experiment.  It 
shows, however, the relevance of appellate review and the need for sentenc-
ing rules that foster meaningful review.  Even in a circuit that has become 
largely Republican or Democratic, there is still a diversity of ideologies 
within each party.  This diversity itself may have a whistleblowing effect 
and may increase consistency in sentencing.  Contrast this situation with 
sentencing in the trial court, where there is only one judge and no check.  In 
addition, the selection process for circuit judges is more rigorous than for 
district judges.  District-court appointments are rarely blocked, but circuit 
nominees’ records and personal opinions receive careful scrutiny, and a mi-
nority of senators can block them.81 
B. Regulating Appeal Waivers 
Up to now, we have spoken of appellate review as if it were an auto-
matic check on sentencing-judge variation.  But appellate courts can, of 
course, review only those sentences that are appealed.  If the parties choose 
not to appeal, then appellate courts can do nothing to police trial courts.  
For this reason, the widespread use of appeal waivers is troubling.   
In an excellent empirical study, Nancy King and Michael O’Neill 
found that defendants waived their rights to appeal in nearly two-thirds of 
all plea-bargained cases.82  The authors also found evidence that defendants 
who accepted appeal waivers received lower sentences, suggesting that the 
threat of appellate review influences sentencing.83  It is impossible to know, 
however, if the size of the sentencing discount for accepting an appeal 
waiver is usually proportional to the chance of reversal on appeal.  If the 
discounts are roughly proportional, then the threat of appellate review con-
strains parties even if appeal waivers are widespread.  Nevertheless, appeal 
waivers could undermine guideline sentencing by reducing the information 
produced by appellate opinions or by fostering collusive bargains between 
prosecutors and defendants.84  Thus, many of the arguments in favor of ap-
pellate review under the Guidelines also support the regulation of appeal 
waivers.   
 
81  For a discussion, see John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judi-
cial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543 (2005). 
82  Nancy J. King & Michael O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 
55 DUKE L.J. 209, 231 (2005). 
83  Id. at 232–36. 
84  Plea bargaining is a sufficiently low-visibility process, riddled with agency costs, imperfect in-
formation, and psychological biases and heuristics, that there is serious reason to doubt that plea bar-
gains closely track the merits or the outcomes that litigation would have achieved.  See Stephanos Bibas, 
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004). 
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Appeal waivers that restrict the right to appeal sentences that fall 
within a Guidelines range do not risk undercutting the consistent applica-
tion of the Guidelines.  But sweeping waivers of the right to appeal any sen-
tence within the statutory range allow prosecutors and defense lawyers to 
collude.  These sweeping waivers also signal to sentencing judges that they 
can sentence without regard to sentencing law or policy.  To preclude this 
kind of collusion, appellate courts might hold broad waivers unenforceable 
as a matter of public policy.  Likewise, the Department of Justice could is-
sue a policy memorandum forbidding very broad appeal waivers. 
Even if appellate courts and head prosecutors clamp down on appeal 
waivers, collusion remains a problem inherent in plea bargaining.  Defen-
dants, of course, always retain incentives to challenge high sentences, and 
invalidating appeal waivers will free them to do that.  But line prosecutors 
who collude with defense counsel do not want the defendant to appeal be-
cause an appeal would create more work for the prosecutor and unravel the 
bargain.  If the defendant declines to appeal, then it does not matter whether 
an appeal waiver is enforceable.  The only solution, far from a perfect one, 
is for head prosecutors to restrict collusive bargains and to press for more 
appeals of below-Guidelines sentences.  The Department of Justice has 
tried, with uncertain success, to restrict plea bargains that circumvent the 
Guidelines.85  Likewise, Congress pressured prosecutors to report and ap-
peal below-Guidelines sentences through the PROTECT Act.86  These po-
litical checks are imperfect.  But just as the Guidelines are an imperfect 
effort to harmonize judges’ sentences, so too are prosecutorial policies an 
imperfect but useful effort to harmonize prosecutors’ bargains. 
To be fair, the case for centralization is far weaker for crimes that are 
often prosecuted locally, such as robberies and small drug sales.  After all, 
local courthouse working groups make policy in light of the fallback option 
of state law.  Rigid centralization ignores the divergence of federal and state 
sentences, making an enormous amount ride on the fortuity of whether a 
 
85  See, e.g., WILLIAM F. WELD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES (1987) (“The Redbook”), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 333 (1994); Richard Thorn-
burgh, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Plea Policy for Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 13, 1989) (“Thornburgh Blue-
sheet”), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 347 (1994); Memorandum from Attorney General John 
Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing Rec-
ommendations and Sentencing Appeals (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
legislation/ci_03_32/$FILE/AG_Guidance_Stcg_Recs.pdf; Memorandum from Attorney General John 
Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Dis-
position of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/
September/03_ag_516.htm; Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General George J. Terwilliger, 
III to Holders of United States Attorneys’ Manual Title 9, Indictments and Plea Procedures Under 
Guideline Sentencing (Feb. 7, 1992) (“Terwilliger Bluesheet”), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 350 
(1994).  For a suggestion that these efforts do not “meaningfully restrain” prosecutors in practice, see 
Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing After 
Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 193.  
86  Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(l), 117 Stat. 650, 674 (2003). 
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prosecutor takes a case federally.87  The case for centralization is far 
stronger for crimes that are de jure or de facto primarily federal responsi-
bilities.  These include the many cases involving immigration, large-scale 
drug trafficking, tax evasion, terrorism, accounting fraud, and insider trad-
ing.88  At least for these purely federal cases, vigorous oversight of line 
prosecutors and sentencing judges makes a great deal of sense.  Even for lo-
cal crimes, each prosecutorial office and court of appeals should at least en-
sure intradistrict or intrastate consistency. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay applied positive political theory and recent empirical evi-
dence to critique the Supreme Court’s sentencing guidelines jurisprudence.  
We conclude that the Court’s jurisprudence is deeply misguided.  Binding 
guidelines and searching appellate review are needed to make sentencing 
more consistent and legitimate.  In addition, the Guidelines reflect a politi-
cal bargain struck by legislators and sentencing commissioners, a compact 
that judges should honor.  The Court’s new tack on sentencing undermines 
this process by reducing appellate court review for departures and creating a 
new ground for departures—the nebulous and hard-to-review policy depar-
ture.  On the other hand, we endorse the trend toward more robust appellate 
review of sentencing adjustments, which judges can at times manipulate to 
alter sentences substantially.  Stricter review of adjustments makes the re-
view of sentences more symmetric and should rein in discretion.  Of course, 
even this beneficial feature of Booker and its progeny could be undermined 
if judges are also freer to depart. 
Much of the benefit of a guidelines system comes from introducing ap-
pellate review into the criminal sentencing process.  We could improve this 
system by ensuring political balance on courts of appeals, so that there is 
always at least one judge of a different party to blow the whistle on ideo-
logical manipulation of sentencing rules.  Guidelines coupled with politi-
cally diverse appellate review dampen the political and ideological 
tendencies inherent in judicial discretion.  Whether judges agree with the 
forces that produced the guidelines, they must enforce the resulting legisla-
tive bargain faithfully.  Legislatures and sentencing commissions have de-
mocratic mandates to channel judicial discretion with rules.  Appellate 
judges need to check and balance both sentencing judges and their own ap-
pellate colleagues, and overly broad appeal waivers threaten that check.  
This system of institutional checks and balances would prevent judges of a 
single political ideology from unilaterally warping sentencing law to serve 
their own biases and preferences. 
 
87  Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The Center Doesn’t, 
117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1396–1407 (2008). 
88  Id. at 1407–11. 
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APPENDIX 
Sentencing Table (in months of imprisonment) 
 
  Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points) 
 Offense 
Level 
I 
(0 or 1) 
II 
(2 or 3) 
III 
(4, 5, 6) 
IV 
(7, 8, 9) 
V 
(10, 11, 12) 
VI 
(13 or more) 
 1 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 
 2 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 1–7 
 3 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 2–8 3–9 
4 0–6 0–6 0–6 2–8 4–10 6–12 
Zone A 
5 0–6 0–6 1–7 4–10 6–12 9–15 
 6 0–6 1–7 2–8 6–12 9–15 12–18 
 7 0–6 2–8 4–10 8–14 12–18 15–21 
 8 0–6 4–10 6–12 10–16 15–21 18–24 
9 4–10 6–12 8–14 12–18 18–24 21–27 
Zone B 
10 6–12 8–14 10–16 15–21 21–27 24–30 
11 8–14 10–16 12–18 18–24 24–30 27–33 
Zone C 
12 10–16 12–18 15–21 21–27 27–33 30–37 
 13 12–18 15–21 18–24 24–30 30–37 33–41 
 14 15–21 18–24 21–27 27–33 33–41 37–46 
 15 18–24 21–27 24–30 30–37 37–46 41–51 
 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
 25 57–71 63–78 70–87 84–105 100–125 110–137 
 26 63–78 70–87 78–97 92–115 110–137 120–150 
 27 70–87 78–97 87–108 100–125 120–150 130–162 
 28 78–97 87–108 97–121 110–137 130–162 140–175 
 29 87–108 97–121 108–135 121–151 140–175 151–188 
 30 97–121 108–135 121–151 135–168 151–188 168–210 
 31 108–135 121–151 135–168 151–188 168–210 188–235 
Zone D 32 121–151 135–168 151–188 168–210 188–235 210–262 
 33 135–168 151–188 168–210 188–235 210–262 235–293 
 34 151–188 168–210 188–235 210–262 235–293 262–327 
 35 168–210 188–235 210–262 235–293 262–327 292–365 
 36 188–235 210–262 235–293 262–327 292–365 324–405 
 37 210–262 235–293 262–327 292–365 324–405 360–life 
 38 235–293 262–327 292–365 324–405 360–life 360–life 
 39 262–327 292–365 324–405 360–life 360–life 360–life 
 40 292–365 324–405 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 
 41 324–405 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 
 42 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 
 43 Life Life Life Life Life Life 
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